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By Dr Graham Gudgin, Research Associate at the Centre For 
Business Research Judge Business school University of 
Cambridge and and Co-Editor of BriefingsForBrexit* 
Rumours that the Brexit trade negotiations will stall and ending the 
Transition may be delayed have accompanied escalation in the virus 
crisis. This article reviews the evidence on the progression of the virus 
and its economic consequences and concludes with hope that a 
return to normality in the second half of the year will allow Brexit 
negotiations to proceed on-course. 
For most people Brexit is the least of their worries this week. As the 
death toll associated with the virus escalates rapidly and the counter-
measures assume a severity not seen since WW2, most are 
struggling to come to terms with a world that has changed at 
astonishing speed. The impact on Brexit has understandably been 
submerged beneath a torrent of virus-related news but there are 
important considerations. 
The difficulty in carrying on with face to face trade negotiations is not 
the main issue. Teleconferencing is an adequate even if not 
completely satisfactory substitute. Much more important is the 
possibility that the transition period may be extended beyond the end 
of this year. The argument (not surprisingly encouraged by 
Remainers) is that the battle against the Covid-19 virus will occupy all 
of our administrative resources leaving no scope in government for 
implementing complex new trade and customs arrangements. 
This is particularly relevant to the additional complexities of a ‘no deal’ 
(WTO or Australian scenario) option. If the preparations for no deal 
look impossible to achieve this year, then the threat of ‘no trade deal’ 
loses credibility and helps the EU to stall the negotiations. Ending the 
Transition period within a year is enshrined in UK law. A Johnson 
Government would be most reluctant to repeal the legislation and 
extend the Transition but could do so if the public felt that tackling the 
virus was the overwhelmingly more important issue. 
However, the virus has already been beaten, at least for now, in 
China where no new domestic cases have been reported in recent 
days. If the same happened in the UK by June the normal life could 
be resumed including on negotiations over Brexit. The important 
questions for the UK are firstly whether the virus outbreak can be 
controlled in the ways that several far-eastern countries have 
demonstrated. Secondly, will the counter-measures adopted in the UK 
cause so much economic damage that dealing with the economy 
leads to delaying the preparations for leaving the transition. 
It is difficult to assess the future path of the virus because the UK data 
on the epidemic is so unreliable. The official count of Covid-19 cases 
today (March 23rd) is that there have been 5683 recorded cases and 
281 deaths with the virus. This figure is higher than China’s and 
higher than the reported death rates in Germany, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland, and over twice that of France or the 
Netherlands. 
The most likely reason for these huge differences is the number of 
tests in for the virus in each country. Germany has conducted twice as 
many tests as the UK’s 50,000 and is rigorous in testing the family 
and other contacts of those testing positive. Germany has greater 
health service capacity to deal with the virus and more respirators but 
at this stage of the outbreak it seems unlikely that the actual survival 
rates of infected patients should differ much between Germany and 
the UK more especially once patients reach hospital. Even if the 
survival rate of infected patients in the UK was half that of Germany 
the UK death rate would still be ten times higher than in Germany. 
 If we assume that the reporting of deaths with the virus is more 
accurate than counting those who actually have contracted the virus, 
then it seems likely that the UK is grossly undercounting the number 
of cases by a factor of at least ten. Instead of the reported 5683 
people testing positive, the actual number who have contracted the 
virus may be more than 40,000. This would put the UK path of 
infected individuals on one of the highest growth trajectories of any 
country and higher than Italy. The rapidly increasing death rate in Italy 
obviously presents a grave warning to the UK. 
The Chinese and South Korean examples do however show that the 
epidemic can be contained, and the stringent measures adopted in 
the UK will hopefully now be sufficient to control the outbreak. The 
wider question is the scale of the economic consequences. The 
closing of schools is a major escalation. Evidence from previous 
epidemics is that a third of infections occur in schools (with another 
third within families). Closing the schools is thus necessary and, in 
any case, large numbers of children had already been withdrawn by 
their parents. 
The downside is that many parents and carers may need to stay off 
work leading to a loss of incomes and output in the economy. Even 
without school closures for non-key workers the removal of 
grandparents from child-minding already creates a problem for 
parents and hence for the economy especially since close to a third of 
children have only a single parent at home. Some basic arithmetic 
suggests that 10% of the labour force may be affected leading to a 
loss of output of perhaps 5% for three months. 
This alone is enough to cause a recession, but it is, of course not the 
end of the story. Although distressingly slow the Government has at 
last moved to guarantee the wages of employees in affected sectors 
who might otherwise be laid off. In addition to existing measures to 
defer VAT and council tax and compensate firms paying sickness 
benefits the Government has plugged several of the potentially largest 
holes in the economic dam. Unemployment may still rise but not now 
by catastrophic amounts. 
Nor will the consequences for public finances be a huge problem and 
certainly not of the scale to present a danger to Brexit. The large cost 
of all of the direct remedial measures (perhaps £50 billion not 
counting the larger loan guarantees) is likely to at least double public 
borrowing this year, but the cost to the Government in interest 
payments will be small. This is due to Bank of England actions. 
Despite denials from the new Governor of the Bank of England, 
arrangements have been made to indirectly fund the measures 
through printing money rather than via interest-bearing debt. Ths 
repeats what was done in the wake of the 2008 banking crisis. 
After several weeks of damaging hesitancy, No. 10, the Treasury and 
the Bank of England have now probably done enough to get the virus 
under control and to limit the economic damage. We can have some 
hope that the second half of 2020 will see something like a 
resumption of normality. In these circumstances the end of the 
Transition period might proceed on-course. 
*This blog post was originally posted here. 
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